Thy Brother’s Keeper? The Relationship between Social Distance and Intensity of Dehumanization during Genocide by Haagensen, Lisa & Croes, Marnix
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An
International Journal
Volume 7 | 2012 Issue 2 | Article 7
Thy Brother’s Keeper? The Relationship between
Social Distance and Intensity of Dehumanization
during Genocide
Lisa Haagensen
Marnix Croes
Abstract.
This paper puts forth the hypothesis that the degree of social distance between perpetrator and vic-
tim groups prior to the outbreak of genocide is inversely related to the degree of severity of dehu-
manization employed by the perpetrator group during genocide. Derived from psychological theory,
this hypothesis is illustrated by using a primarily literature-based method of analysis combined with
a vignette-designed severity of dehumanization scale. Three genocides are compared: the Rwandan
Genocide, the Holocaust as it occurred in Western Europe, and the Holocaust as it occurred in East-
ern Europe. The findings for Rwanda and the Holocaust in Eastern Europe show a negative correla-
tion between the two variables, confirming the hypothesis. The results for Western Europe, however,
present somewhat of an anomaly; variations in the extermination policies of the German perpetra-
tors in Eastern and Western Europe correspond to this difference and can, in this case, provide a
possible explanation for the incongruity.
Keywords.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Haagensen, Lisa and Croes, Marnix (2012) "Thy Brother’s Keeper? The Relationship between Social Distance and Intensity of
Dehumanization during Genocide," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 7: Iss. 2: Article 7.
DOI: 10.3138/gsp.7.2/3.223
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol7/iss2/7
psychology, social distance, perpetrators, victims, barbarity, genocide, Rwanda, Holo- caust,
dehumanization
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp
Thy Brother’s Keeper? The Relationship between Social
Distance and Intensity of Dehumanization during Genocide
Lisa Haagensen1
University of Amsterdam
Marnix Croes
Netherlands Ministry of Safety and Justice
This paper puts forth the hypothesis that the degree of social distance between perpetrator and vic-
tim groups prior to the outbreak of genocide is inversely related to the degree of severity of dehu-
manization employed by the perpetrator group during genocide. Derived from psychological theory,
this hypothesis is illustrated by using a primarily literature-based method of analysis combined with
a vignette-designed severity of dehumanization scale. Three genocides are compared: the Rwandan
Genocide, the Holocaust as it occurred in Western Europe, and the Holocaust as it occurred in East-
ern Europe. The ﬁndings for Rwanda and the Holocaust in Eastern Europe show a negative correla-
tion between the two variables, conﬁrming the hypothesis. The results for Western Europe, however,
present somewhat of an anomaly; variations in the extermination policies of the German perpetra-
tors in Eastern and Western Europe correspond to this difference and can, in this case, provide a
possible explanation for the incongruity.
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Introduction
In her seminal work on genocide, Helen Fein deﬁnes the phenomenon as the “sustained
purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collective directly or indir-
ectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members,
sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.”2 Genocide
and other forms of mass killing have recurred frequently over the past 50 years. Events
in Rwanda and Darfur, for instance, are just two examples of recent genocidal events
that have left the international community in shock.3 Surprisingly perhaps, the perpe-
trators of this barbarity are neither extraordinary nor particularly prone to pathology
and/or insanity. Rather, perpetrators typically reﬂect an ordinary distribution of hu-
manity4: some are wealthy while others are impoverished; some are religious and others
agnostic; some are relatively young and others relatively old. Most of them are not
psychologically impaired nor are they typically the products of abusive childhoods.5 In
short, the majority of perpetrators of genocide are ordinary people.6
This is particularly apparent when examining the Rwandan Genocide, a case where
the killers were, to a large extent, not only ordinary civilians but also often personally
acquainted with their victims. Even so, they displayed an extraordinary inclination
toward brutality. Innocent Rwililiza, a survivor of the Rwandan Genocide, reﬂects that
the cruelty of the slaughter was not executed by “demons or drug-crazed interahamwe”
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(Hutu militias), but rather by “neighbors with whom we used to chat while walking to
the market.”7 During his interview, Rwililiza poses two important questions: “Why did
they chop people up instead of killing them straightaway? . . . If there was killing to be
done, all that had to be done was kill, but why chop arms and legs?”8 As illustrated by
the survivor and perpetrator interviews conducted by Jean Hatzfeld, many otherwise
ordinary Rwandan did not simply kill their victims. Rather, they inﬂicted a maximum
amount of pain and suffering, often wounding and leaving their Tutsi neighbors to die
slow and agonizing deaths.9 Considering that the vast majority of perpetrators were nei-
ther insane nor drugged, how can one explain the unwarranted mutilation, torture, and
suffering they inﬂicted on their victims? According to Rwililiza, it was their personal ac-
quaintanceships with their victims that became the driving force behind the malice. In
his view, mutilation and torture represented the means through which the humanity of
the victims was removed and the task of killing made easier.10
In this paper we seek to develop the hypothesis that social proximity prior to geno-
cides enhances severity of dehumanization during genocide. In other words, the smaller
the social distance between the perpetrator group and the victim group the more severe
the dehumanizing behaviors of the perpetrators. To do this we compare the cruelty
of the killing methods employed by Rwandan perpetrators during the Rwandan Geno-
cide and German perpetrators during the Holocaust in Eastern and Western Europe.
To simplify the task of comparison, Germany is used as a model for Western Europe,
while the Baltic states and Poland are used as models for Eastern Europe. Although the
perpetrators of the Holocaust were in no way limited to those of German nationality,
we have to limit our analysis of the behavior of the perpetrators to German nationals
for reasons of conciseness. For the same reason, the victim group is limited to people
who were deemed Jewish according to the Nazi deﬁnition.11 As such, in the case of
Western Europe, the perpetrators are Germans while the victims are German Jews. In
the case of Eastern Europe, the perpetrators are again limited to Germans while the vic-
tims are Polish and Baltic Jews. Finally, in the case of Rwanda, the perpetrator group re-
fers to Hutu perpetrators while the victim group refers to Tutsi victims.
The reasons for which these two cases have been selected are twofold: First, the
Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust represent two of the most widely researched and
examined cases of genocide today. Consequently, in each case there exists a wealth of
information that can be drawn upon for this study. Second, in order to assess the effects
of social distance on dehumanization one requires contexts that are characterized by
different degrees of social distance. The Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust—given
that we distinguish between the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and the Holocaust in
Western Europe—represent three such cases. The Rwandan Genocide was a “neighbor-
hood genocide”12 where individuals from the victim and perpetrator groups were per-
sonally acquainted with one another. In contrast, the Holocaust in Eastern Europe was
a predominantly bureaucratic and military-driven undertaking targeting a diffuse popu-
lation with whom the German perpetrators were not previously acquainted.13 With
regard to the Holocaust in Germany, acquaintanceship between the German perpetra-
tors and the Jewish victim group did exist, albeit to a lesser extent than in Rwanda.
Theory
At ﬁrst glance, our hypothesis may appear counterintuitive from the perspective that
acquaintanceship overcomes social barriers and bridges social gaps—a viewpoint, for
instance, that underlies Dutch public policy for preventing segregation in public
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primary schools.14 However, psychological theory supports our hypothesis. The argu-
ment put forth in this paper begins with the assessment that for most people, hurting
another human being is unpleasant. Indeed, “most people ﬁnd it deeply upsetting to
inﬂict harm, pain or death on another person.”15 Consequently, no matter the extent of
prejudice and hate one group may feel for another, reservations against killing fellow
human beings are deeply entrenched. If systemic killing involving mass participation is
to transpire, the target group’s status as human beings—as being part of the same moral
universe as the perpetrators—must ﬁrst be removed.16 Through dehumanization, the
target group is rendered sub- or non-human in the eyes of the perpetrator group, clearly
distinguishing “us” from “them.”17 Ultimately, this is a process of facilitation because
killing individuals who have been devalued and excluded from the realm of humanity is
easier than killing those who have not.18 Restraints against persecution and violence are
eliminated and mass killings can then unfold within this context of moral exclusion.19
“Anything that is done to someone who is morally excluded is permissible no matter
how heinous the action.”20 This makes dehumanization a vital cog in the wheel of mass
killing campaigns.
Dehumanization can be viewed from the perpetrator’s perspective as well as a vic-
tim’s, and encompasses both the process whereby others’ humanity is denied and the
cruelty and suffering that embody that process.21 The majority of psychological research
tends to focus on dehumanization as a process in which negative imagery campaigns
and propaganda are employed to reduce the target group’s humanity before genocide.22
An extensive vocabulary is frequently employed to assign demeaning and animalistic—
or non-human—qualities to those comprising the target group.23 Cockroach, vermin,
and parasite are some of the epithets associated with past cases of genocide.24 This type
of systematic labeling represents a primary way of stripping the humanity of the target
group while simultaneously inciting the perpetrator group against them.25
Dehumanization, however, does not only play a role in preparing the ground for
genocide; it also drives genocidal campaigns forward, sustaining killing operations over
lengths of time.26 The very dynamic of mass killing necessitates and intensiﬁes dehu-
manization, for no matter the extent to which one is labeled cockroach or parasite, ex-
terminating people perceived as vermin is simply not the same as exterminating real
vermin.27 As a result, those who participate in genocidal massacres will infuse their acts
with dehumanizing vocabulary in a further and ﬁnal attempt to break the bonds that tie
human beings together.28 Dehumanization is as much a part of the killing operations of
genocidal campaigns as it is their preparation.
The actual killing that occurs during genocide is always imbued with a degree of
dehumanization; however, the degree of severity of dehumanization can vary. It is our
hypothesis that such a variation is somewhat determined by prior social distance. Im-
portantly, it must be acknowledged that degrees of social distance do not translate into
degrees of amicability. For instance, small social distance does not necessarily imply
fondness for the other group. Dislike can also be a function of small social distance; as
Roy Baumeister has so aptly put it, “most people reserve their greatest animosities for
people they know well.”29 Nevertheless, it goes without saying that smaller social dis-
tances often engender liking, which can be borne from similarity, sexual attraction, or
relationships of dependence;30 all of these categories presuppose social proximity. As-
suming that human bonds need more dehumanization to break when social nearness is
characterized by fondness, a more precise phrasing of our hypothesis would state that
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where social relations are more affable prior to genocide, more cruelty during genocide
is likely to ensue. However, given that we are not able to measure how friendly social re-
lations are or were—only how close—we have to limit ourselves to the inverse relation
between social distance and severity of dehumanization. Furthermore, it is important to
stress that our hypothesis is solely concerned with differences in perpetrator behavior
during genocide and is not concerned with either why the genocides in question oc-
curred, or with the events leading up to their commencement.
Methods
Measuring social distance
To measure the social distance between the perpetrator and victim groups in Rwanda,
Eastern Europe, and Western Europe, we employed an adaptation of the Bogardus
Social Distance Scale. This scale, named after sociologist Emory S. Bogardus, includes a
sequence of between ﬁve and seven items or statements that convey greater or lesser
intimacy toward members of a particular group.31 The scale is both one-dimensional
and cumulative. Consequently, an individual or group that asserts a certain degree of
intimacy toward another will accept items denoting less intimacy.32 As a result, accept-
ing members from a group on the scale of marriage will automatically signify accep-
tance with regards to the previous scales of friends, work colleagues, and neighbors.
Table 1 illustrates the intimacy items or statements that make up the Bogardus Social
Distance Scale.33
For this study, we have utilized a modiﬁed version of the Bogardus Scale. The
cumulative nature of the original scale enabled us to limit ourselves to the ﬁrst four
items. This made the task at hand decidedly simpler, as data regarding the ﬁrst four ca-
tegories is much easier to come by. Furthermore, the ﬁrst four items on the limited scale
were modiﬁed from their original survey question format into four socio-demographic
categories of social distance: intermarriage, social interaction, workforce integration,
and community integration.34 Table 2 presents the limited version of the social distance
scale and the associated socio-demographic conditions.
Using the modiﬁed scale, we analyzed the literature to determine the social distance
between the perpetrator and victim groups in each of the genocides studied.
Measuring Severity of Dehumanization
Measuring severity of dehumanization entails an in-depth analysis of published per-
sonal accounts and testimonies of survivors, bystanders, and perpetrators of the three
case studies. There are two justiﬁcations for the selection of this literature: First and
foremost, in order to obtain accurate depictions of the dehumanization behavior
Table 1 – Bogardus Social Distance Scale
1 Would marry
2 Would have as regular friends
3 Would work beside in an ofﬁce
4 Would have several families in my neighborhood
5 Would have merely as speaking acquaintances
6 Would live outside my neighborhood
7 Would live outside my country
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employed, ﬁrst-hand accounts from those who witnessed and even experienced such
events are vital. However, the nature of the topic is particularly sensitive due to its
focuses on episodes of extreme trauma and distress. Analyzing published personal ac-
counts and testimonies have represented an unobtrusive means of accessing eyewitness
accounts. Simply put, published personal accounts and testimonies have allowed us to
capture incidents of dehumanization without having to put those who witnessed these
traumatic events through renewed pain or distress during interviews. Furthermore, as-
sessing testimonies from perpetrators, victims, and bystanders has allowed us to gather
a variety of depictions stemming from all vantage points; this in itself has limited bias.
Second, the wealth of published personal accounts and testimonies of survivors, bystan-
ders, and perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide and the Holocaust render the conduct-
ing of fresh, ﬁrst-hand interviews unnecessary.
Consequently, in order to determine the degree of dehumanization, we have care-
fully examined the literature from which we compiled a list of all the dehumanizing be-
haviors represented in each case study. Any perpetrator behavior that encompassed
some degree of humiliation, dehumanization, or the inﬂicting of some level of pain—
physical and/or psychological—during the killing operations of genocide was consid-
ered to be dehumanizing behavior. Within each of the three lists, the behaviors were
subsequently grouped according to ﬁve behavior categories: dehumanizing living condi-
tions; psychological dehumanization; physical dehumanization without physical pain;
and physical dehumanization with physical pain. The latter was further separated into
abuse with the use of instruments and abuse without instruments.
Dehumanizing living conditions concerns living conditions that are unﬁt for human
dwelling and threaten survival. The victim is forced, either directly or indirectly, to
endure these conditions for extended periods of time.
Psychological dehumanization concerns perpetrator behaviors that inﬂict psycho-
logical torment, humiliation, and/or dehumanization upon the victim. Behaviors within
this category range from derogatory labeling and name-calling, through to threats,
taunts, degrading insults, defamation, and slander.
Physical dehumanization without physical pain concerns any humiliating and de-
humanizing behavior or action that is either inﬂicted upon a victim by a perpetrator, or
that the victim is forced to perform him- or herself. These actions are devoid of physical
pain.
Physical dehumanization with physical pain concerns any behavior that not only di-
minishes the humanity of the victim but also inﬂicts a degree of physical pain upon that
person. This group of behaviors was divided into two subgroups: abuse with instru-
ments and without instruments. Instrument refers to any tool or weapon used by a
Table 2 – Modiﬁed Bogardus Social Distance Scale
Social Distance Category Corresponding socio-demographic
condition
Would marry Intermarriage
Would have as regular friends Social Interaction
Would work beside in an ofﬁce Workforce Integration
Would have several families in my
neighborhood
Community Integration
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perpetrator to inﬂict torture, pain, and humiliation. Such instruments range from guns,
clubs, and machetes, through to ﬁre, water, and attack dogs. Conversely, behaviors cate-
gorized as abuse without instruments refer to all actions in which pain and humiliation
are inﬂicted without the explicit use of a tool. Beatings with hands and feet are examples
of this type of physical dehumanization. Table 3 presents the dehumanizing behavior
categories that we distinguished.
Once all the dehumanizing behaviors were divided among these ﬁve categories, a
smaller list containing the cruelest behaviors was compiled. To ensure that our analysis
was not only based on a compilation of cruel exceptions, the behaviors had to have
been regularly inﬂicted. However, it must be acknowledged that since our analysis is
based on the available second-hand literature, the precise frequency with which these
behaviors occurred is unknown. Consequently, the behaviors chosen were those that
were most common in the literature consulted. To compile this smaller list, behaviors
were ranked according to the physical and psychological pain they inﬂicted on the vic-
tims. The categories included no pain, least pain, pain, most pain, and death. Death was
further divided into “immediate death” and “prolonged death.” Based on this categori-
zation, the two most painful and most commonly employed behaviors for each geno-
cide were chosen per dehumanizing behavior category. As a result, 10 behaviors
representing the most common and most severe dehumanization were identiﬁed for
each case. Consequently, a ﬁnal list of 30 dehumanizing behaviors was compiled. To
determine which genocide had the most severe dehumanization, this ﬁnal list of 30 had
to be ranked on a scale from one to 30, with a score of 30 constituting the cruelest
behavior and a score of one representing the least cruel behavior. We chose not to do
the ranking ourselves to preclude any potential teleological result. Instead, we asked
eight members of a working group who did not know the aim of our research to do the
ranking for us. Although subjectivity was not completely defeated in this way, the opi-
nions upon which the ranking was based were diversiﬁed and as a result, the extremes
were averaged out and therefore play a smaller role.
Social distance measured
Rwanda
Rwanda’s ethnic characteristics and tumultuous political history—during which ﬁrst
the Tutsi minority, supported by the colonizing Germans and Belgians, but since the
1960s the Hutu majority dominated—often leads to the misconception that the Hutu
and the Tutsi were mutually exclusive tribes with little interaction.
In reality, however, they had much in common. They shared important customs,
routines, and societal arrangements, spoke the same language, attended the same
schools, shared the same religion (Christianity), frequented the same bars and shops, in-
termarried, and lived side by side.35 On a personal level, the Hutu and Tutsi shared
Table 3 – Categories of Dehumanizing Behavior
1. Dehumanizing Living Conditions
2. Psychological Dehumanization
3. Physical Dehumanization without Physical Pain
4. Physical Dehumanization with Physical Pain - Abuse without Instruments
5. Physical Dehumanization with Physical Pain - Abuse with Instruments
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amicable relations. They were neighbors, friends, and even members of the same fam-
ily.36 This was also true of the génocidaires. Scott Straus conducted interviews with 210
convicted genocide perpetrators detained in 15 prisons across Rwanda where he asked
the respondents four questions regarding interethnic proximity and intermarriage
prior to the genocide.37 The answers are presented in Table 4. Almost all génocidaires
claimed to have had Tutsi neighbors and would have allowed their child to marry a
Tutsi, or would have married a Tutsi themselves. More than two thirds had Tutsi family
members.
In addition, Straus enquired about the nature of Hutu-Tutsi interaction after
1990 but before 1994 when civil war broke out between the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF)—a Tutsi rebel group operating from Uganda—and the Hutu regime. These ques-
tions were designed to reveal the sentiments, either positive or negative, that character-
ized Hutu-Tutsi relations. Table 538 shows that the greater majority claimed that
relations were “positive” before 1994, while Table 6 shows that they remained “positive”
even after the war began in 1990.
Table 4 – Tutsi-Hutu Interaction in Percentages (weighted results)
Before 1994, did you
have any Tutsi
neighbors? (N=210)a
Before 1994, did you
have any Tutsi family
members? (N=205)b
Before 1994, would
you have allowed
your child to marry
a Tutsi, or would
you have married a
Tutsi yourself?
(N=195)c
Yes 96.0 68.8 98.9
No 3.6 28.3 1.1
I do not know 0.4 2.9 0
Total 100 100 100
a Only one respondent was not Hutu. Although he carried a Hutu identity card, he claimed
his entire family was considered Tutsi.
b Any blood relation or relation by marriage is considered a family member.
c Married men and fathers were asked if their child would be permitted to marry a Tutsi,
while unmarried men were asked if they themselves would marry a Tutsi woman.
Table 5 – Relations between Hutu and Tutsi neighbors before 1994 in percentages (weighted
results)
Before 1994, how were your relations
with your Tutsi neighbor? (N=200)
Positivea 86.5
‘No problem’ 11.2
Negativeb 2.4
Total 100
a Responses that have been labelled as positive include: good, very good; truly good; more
than 100%; we were friends; we shared and we intermarried.
b Responses labelled as negative include: not good; we were friends before 1990; not good
after 1990 and; they were accomplices.
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It must, of course, be acknowledged that the reliability of the results could be called
into question due to the limited number of respondents on the one hand, and the fact
that the respondents were exclusively perpetrators on the other. Straus’s ﬁndings, how-
ever, mirror those from other sources.39
Intermarriage
Rwanda has a well-documented history of intermarriage.40 As generally described by
the literature, mixed marriages were a common occurrence and can be traced back to
pre- and early-colonial times.41 Callixte, a genocide survivor from the Ntarama locality,
recalls that “about two thirds of Tutsi daughters would be married to a Hutu. But Hutu
daughters married to Tutsi men were only 1 percent. Prospects were better for Tutsi
daughters marrying Hutu men. They would get better opportunities.”42 Although this
distribution is unlikely, we take Callixte’s statement as further evidence that intermar-
riage was widespread. The high degree of intermarriage is also mentioned in other sur-
vivor testimonies and in witness and perpetrator accounts, albeit often in the context of
inter-marital killing.43 According to one such a survivor, “Tutsi women married to
Hutu were killed. I know only one who survived. The administration forced Hutu men
to kill their Tutsi wives before they go to kill anyone else—to prove they were true inter-
ahamwe.”44 This high rate of intermarriage is indicative of a society with little social dis-
tance between victim and perpetrator groups.
Social Interaction
Numerous personal accounts from both Hutu and Tutsi reveal close social relationships
and personal friendships between the two groups.45 Hutu and Tutsi children and teen-
agers were relatively well integrated. Not only did they engage in shared leisure activ-
ities, but they were also part of the same sports teams. The Nyamata soccer team was
one such group of players that encompassed both Hutu and Tutsi.46 Tite Rushita, inter-
viewed by Hatzfeld, paints a picture of affable, cheerful relations in which the love of
the game overrode any hint of ethnic tension. Although the civil war of the early 1990s
marked the beginning of a swift decline in these once agreeable afﬁliations and the 1994
genocide pitted previous teammates against one another, their pre-1994 interactions
were generally social and harmonious in nature.47 Rushita’s description is reinforced by
numerous testimonies from those who lived through the genocide. Angélique Muka-
manzi conveys in her interview with Hatzfeld that her pre-1994 social circle was an eth-
nically mixed group of both Tutsi and Hutu.48 In Charles Mironko’s interviews with a
group of perpetrators residing in six Rwandan prisons, the majority alluded to a histori-
cal friendship between the two ethnic groups.49 While one respondent discusses regular
Table 6 – Relations between Hutu and Tutsi neighbors after 1990 in percentages (weighted
results)
Did your relations with your Tutsi neighbor
change after the war began in 1990? (N=185)
No 86.5
A little 1.0
Yes 12.5
Total 100
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social visits and blood brotherhood pacts, another talks of regular gift exchanges in the
form of cows and other items.50 The common premise connecting these testimonies is a
high rate of amicable social interaction. Social distance can therefore be considered
minimal within this category.
Workforce Integration
To some extent, the workforce that characterized post-colonial, pre-genocide Rwanda
did show an ethnic division of labor. This was especially the case in the state sector. For
instance, in the army and the intermediate to upper strata of government, transparent,
anti-Tutsi policies were actively employed. Other areas of the public sector, although
absent of ofﬁcial discriminatory measures, also exhibited a Hutu-dominant workforce.51
Consequently, this sector of Rwanda’s pre-genocide workforce did not exhibit compre-
hensive ethnic integration.
However, the vast majority of Rwandans (both Hutu and Tutsi) did not participate
in the public sector labor force, but rather found employment in peasant farming.52 Sta-
tistics taken from Rwanda’s 1990 Human Development Report show that 92.8% of the
Rwandan labor force at the time worked in agriculture.53 The 1991 Rwandan census
puts this number at only a slightly lower 90.9% (91.9% for Hutu, 85.5% for Tutsi). It
further underlines the importance of agriculture by showing that only 5.5% of the popu-
lation lived in cities.
Land and cattle have traditionally represented the two sides of Rwanda’s agrarian
and pastoral economy. Hutu tended to manage more of the food production in Rwan-
dan society. Armed with farming implements such as the hoe and the machete, these
farmers employed intensive labor to ensure the harvesting of crops.54 Generally uncom-
fortable in the company of livestock, Hutu planters considered cattle breeding to be an
extravagance not beﬁtting the typically arid landscapes of Rwanda. Animal husbandry
was the historical pastime of the Tutsi pastoralists, who contributed to Rwanda’s econ-
omy through cattle breeding and milk production.55 Consequently, while the vast
majority of the Rwandan population was united in its agricultural occupations, differing
specializations within the agrarian economy resulted in an agricultural workforce that
was not comprehensively integrated. However, given that this agricultural specialization
was not associated with differences in socioeconomic status—those who worked in agri-
culture were generally poor56—the social distance between the two groups can, from
this perspective, still be considered small.
Community Integration
Pre-genocide Rwanda was initially divided into 11 prefectures. Table 7 depicts the eth-
nic distribution in these prefectures in 1991.
As the table shows, not a single one of these zones was restricted to just one ethnic
group. In spite of the clear numerical dominance of the Hutu, the two groups lived side
by side and generally without segregation.57 In fact, Straus’s analysis of ﬁve communes
from ﬁve prefectures shows that the Tutsi population was actually in excess of 10%.
Communes such as Giti, Musambira, and Kanzenze boasted quite large numbers of
Tutsi.58 As a result, ethnic segregation along provincial, regional, or community lines
does not appear to have been a feature of pre-genocide Rwanda.
Numerous survivor testimonies corroborate this portrait of community integration.
Christine Nyiransabimana, a Tutsi, for instance, stated, “In my area, and in Nyamata
town, I saw many Hutu relations and neighbors killing Tutsis every day of the
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genocide.”59 In describing the death of her father, Angélique Mukamanzi stated, “He
was run through by a Hutu neighbor.”60 When talking about their neighbors and rela-
tions who took part in the killings, many survivors and witnesses referred to it as “turn-
ing Interahamwe.” In other words, these individuals had displayed no previous
alignment with Hutu extremism or radical militia groups.61 This expression not only
implies a level of familiarity but also that those who were not expected to join the
slaughter did. Essentially, the Hutu and Tutsi lived side by side in the same villages and
in the same towns; there was little social distance with regard to their localities.
To conclude, in all categories of social distance studied, the Hutu and Tutsi dis-
played high levels of interaction. Social distance between these two groups prior to the
1994 genocide can therefore be considered to be small.
Germany
Assessing the social distance between the German perpetrators and the German-Jewish
target group within Germany is not a straightforward task as the Nazis implemented
widespread anti-Jewish legislation after their rise to power in 1933. As a result of these
discriminatory laws, the social distance between the Jewish victim group and the Ger-
man perpetrator group was deliberately manipulated in the years leading up to the
extermination carried out by the Nazi regime.
In the years prior to Nazi rule and following the fall of Imperial Germany, the Wei-
mar Republic was characterized by the widespread integration of Jews in all spheres of
German life. The 1925 census calculated the Jewish population at 564,379 Israelites or
0.9% of the total German population. The demographic distribution of the population
at that time showed that 66.8% of the Jewish populace lived in cities with over 100,000
inhabitants. Six of Germany’s largest cities—Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Breslau,
Table 7 – Distribution (%) of the Population of Rwanda by Prefecture and Ethnic Group in
1991a
Prefecture Ethnic Distribution Total Population
(numerical)
Hutu Tutsi Twa Other
Butare 82.0 17.3 0.7 0.0 753,868
Byumba 98.2 1.5 0.2 0.0 775,935
Cyangugu 88.7 10.5 0.5 0.3 551,565
Gikongoro 86.3 12.8 0.8 0.1 465,814
Gisenyi 96.8 2.9 0.3 0.1 731,996
Gitarama 90.2 9.2 0.6 0.1 848,027
Kibungo 92.0 7.7 0.2 0.1 648,912
Kibuye 84.8 14.8 0.4 0.0 469,494
Kigali 90.8 8.8 0.4 0.1 905,632
Kigali-ville 81.4 17.9 0.3 0.4 221,806
Ruhengeri 99.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 766,795
Total 91.1 8.4 0.4 0.1 7,099,844
a Recensement général de la population et de l’habitat au 15 Août, 1991. Résultats déﬁnitifs,
service national de Recensement, ministère du Plan, Kigali. [General census of population
and housing on 15 August 1991. Final Results, National Census Service, Ministry of
Planning, Kigali.]
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Leipzig, and Cologne—were home to 49% of all Jews in the country. 16% of the Jewish
population resided in smaller cities with between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, while
the remaining 17% lived in towns and villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants.62 The
assimilation of the Jewish community into the greater German society was especially
evident in of the high rate of intermarriage before the genocide. Among all Jewish mar-
riages between 1926 and 1930, 21.5% constituted mixed marriages.63 This trend pro-
ceeded into the early days of Nazi rule, with 44% of German Jews choosing to marry
non-Jews in 1933.64 In fact, roughly 35,000 Jews lived in mixed marriages in 1933.65
The Jews and gentiles enjoyed peaceful and indeed intimate relations during the pre-
genocide era.66
However, the ﬁnal years of the Weimar Republic were decidedly tumultuous and
witnessed an escalation of anti-Semitism, especially within the manifestos and propa-
ganda tactics of political parties like the National Socialist German Workers’ Party
(NSDAP, “Nazi” Party). The 1933 Nazi takeover represented a turning point in
German-Jewish integration. The years immediately preceding the genocide of European
Jewry were characterized by widespread efforts on the part of the Nazi regime to set up
barriers between German Jews and gentiles. The anti-Jewish policies and legislation out-
lined below not only depicts the ways in which the Nazis attempted to curtail their in-
teractions, but also the extent to which these policies were actively pursued.
Intermarriage
The 1935 Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor marked the ﬁrst phase in
the Nazi-led venture to curtail all interactions between Jews and gentiles. This law not
only prevented German women under the age of 45 from working in Jewish house-
holds, hotels, and health resorts, but also prohibited mixed marriages and extramarital
intercourse.67 Any mixed marriage occurring after the decree was not only automati-
cally invalidated, but also considered to be an afﬁrmation of guilt of extramarital inter-
course. This decree was immediately supplemented with laws concerning the marriage
practices of Mischlinge (crossbreeds) of the ﬁrst and second degree—that is, with two or
one Jewish grandparents, respectively. More speciﬁcally, marriages between a Mischling
of the second degree and a Jew were prohibited, as were marriages between a Mischling
of the second degree and another Mischling of the second degree. Furthermore, Mis-
chlinge of the ﬁrst degree could only marry other Mischlinge of the ﬁrst degree or Jews.
Through such policies, German-Jewish intermarriage was strictly curtailed.
Social Interaction
The 1930s were characterized by a number of laws that sought to reduce social interac-
tion between Jews and gentiles. In April 1933, the Law against Overcrowding of German
Schools was passed. It declared that the admission of non-Aryans into schools and col-
leges had to reﬂect the proportion of non-Aryans in the total German population. This
law had far-reaching repercussions for Jewish students. By 1936, more than half of all
Jewish students were forced to attend Jewish schools established by the Jewish commu-
nity. By 1938, all Jewish students had been denied access to German schools and were
as such enrolled in Jewish schools.68 Other restrictive measures included the introduc-
tion of travel regulations whereby Jews were forbidden access to dining and sleeping
cars on all trains within Germany; the introduction of separate Jewish shopping hours
by the Food and Agricultural Ministry; the introduction of separate Jewish hospitals;
and denial of access to beaches. From September 1939 onwards, Jews were further
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constrained and isolated by the installation of an 8:00 p.m. curfew. Such limitations
were exacerbated by the imposition of further restrictions on Jewish movements. For
instance, the installation of private telephones in Jewish homes was outlawed. All com-
munication and interaction with the gentile world was steadily reduced.69 The gap
between the perpetrator group and the target group was steadily widened.
Workforce Integration
As 1933 unfolded and Hitler embarked on his ﬁrst year of power, the position of Jews
in Germany’s economy was still strong and their role active. The majority of employed
Jews found themselves in commerce. Such specialization stems from a historically low
rate of Jewish employment in the civil service, the army, or agriculture.70 Therefore,
while this sphere of German economic activity witnessed relatively little Jewish-German
integration—only 1.2% of the total population in these professions were Jewish—other
spheres such as commerce and enterprise exhibited higher Jewish representation. For
example, in 1930, 48% of all private bankers and 40% of all textile businesses were Jew-
ish. The Jewish representation in liberal professions however, was nowhere near these
high levels. In 1933, only 2% of all professional positions in Germany were held by
Jews.71
The position of Jews in all spheres of economic life was the ﬁrst area targeted for
segregation by the Nazi regime. In 1933, all non-Aryan ofﬁcials were barred from posi-
tions in public ofﬁce in the state railway company, the civil service, and the Reichs-
bank.72 The ramiﬁcations of this law were not limited, however, to civil servants.
Professionals such as Jewish doctors were suddenly deprived of their afﬁliation with
state-sponsored health insurance programs, and Jewish notaries and lawyers were de-
nied admission to the bar.73 Within a year of Nazi rule, Jewish representation in Ger-
many’s economic and public arenas had been severely curtailed. With the ensuing
Aryanization and liquidation of Jewish enterprises and business establishments, the
Jewish working sector was progressively and deliberately isolated from the greater Ger-
man work force.
Community Integration
By 1939, forced emigration had reduced Germany’s Jewish population to 330,892. Ac-
cording to the 1925 census, the Jewish community was considerably urbanized, a trend
that increased rapidly after the Nazi takeover in 1933. In a bid to escape impoverish-
ment, Jews abandoned the isolation of small towns and villages for the promise of Ger-
many’s big cities. The 1939 census shows that there were 82,788 Jews in Berlin and
14,461 in Frankfurt.74 Jewish migration within Germany was not, however, accompa-
nied by integration into their new urban neighborhoods. The Nazi government greeted
Jewish urbanization with renewed segregation efforts: namely residential separation.
The Nazi administrative machine set about conﬁning German Jews to separate housing
blocs designated solely for Jewish inhabitants. Such a formidable task required wide-
spread evictions and accompanying legislation. For instance, in 1938, a decree was
passed in which German landlords were authorized to cancel the apartment leases of
Jewish doctors. In 1939, this decree was compounded by another that allowed all Ger-
man landlords to evict Jews if that landlord could provide a certiﬁcate declaring that the
tenant could ﬁnd alternative accommodation.75
Jewish emigration rose dramatically throughout this period. During the ﬁrst 10
years of Hitler’s reign, several hundreds of thousands left the country. By November
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1941, it was estimated that just 160,000 out of the 499,682 counted in the 1933 census
remained in Germany.76 With such deteriorating numbers, Jewish-German interaction
and integration in all areas, particularly living arrangements, would have been reduced.
Establishing an Overall Social Distance Estimate
From their inception into power through to the start of the genocide in 1941, the Nazi
regime set about the systematic separation of the German Jews from the gentiles. The
fact that these efforts were believed to be necessary indicates that social distance
between gentiles and Jews was relatively small. Furthermore, successfully isolating Ger-
man Jews from their non-Jewish counterparts was not guaranteed. Indeed, despite rig-
orous efforts, three events demonstrate the regime’s failure in entrenching considerable
social distance between Jews and gentiles.
The ﬁrst such event was the 1933 boycott. Two months after Hitler’s ascension to
power, the Nazi party organized several mass meetings led by an established boycott
committee. On the agenda was the implementation of a widespread national boycott on
Jewish goods, shops, lawyers, businesses, and doctors.77 Predominantly driven by radi-
cal Sturmabteilung (SA) members, the events of the boycott included the placement of
anti-Jewish placards and SA and Schutzstaffel (SS) guards outside such businesses. The
guards were responsible for deterring shoppers by “informing” them of the Jewish own-
ership of such establishments.78 However, in spite of these efforts, the boycott was ulti-
mately a failure. In truth, the German public largely ignored it and continued to go
about their daily affairs, which included shopping at Jewish-owned stores.79 The signiﬁ-
cance of this evident failure is explicit in its illustration of the overall German sentiment
and implicit in its illustration of the degree of community integration of the Jews. Com-
bined with the two events below, this illustrates the failure of the Nazi regime to create
the social distance it so desired.
The second event was the Kristallnacht. The night of 9 November 1938 was charac-
terized by the destruction of 171 synagogues and 7,500 Jewish businesses, as well as the
arrest and subsequent deportation of 20,000 Jews to concentration camps within the
Reich, such as Dachau and Buchenwald.80 The brutality of this evening must not, how-
ever, mislead one into thinking that it represents anti-Jewish sentiment among the col-
lective German population. The events of the Kristallnacht were no more than a
cleverly orchestrated invention through which the destruction of Jewish synagogues and
businesses were made to appear to be the work of the populace as a whole, when in fact
it was solely the work of Nazi militias.81 The Nazis had to concoct a popular revolt
because German civilians were simply not interested in an anti-Jewish pogrom. This
provides evidence of a smaller social distance than that sought by the Nazis.
The third event is known as the 1943 Rosenstrasse incident or protest. Recall that
German-Jewish intermarriage in 1933 and prior was relatively high. Essentially, it
would have been those Germans in mixed marriages who had close personal contact
with Jews who were most resistant to anti-Jewish policies and propaganda.82 It was
within this context that the 1943 Rosenstrasse incident occurred. At the start of that
year, it was estimated that there were still 16,760 mixed marriages within Germany
proper. It was primarily the Jewish husbands of these marriages who were incarcerated
by the Gestapo in early 1943 and held in a former welfare ofﬁce of the Jewish commu-
nity at Rosenstrasse 2-4 (Rose Street) in Berlin. In response to these arrests, non-Jewish
spouses and relatives openly resisted Nazi rule and gathered themselves in signiﬁcant
numbers outside the building.83 The SS, however, did not arrest or shoot the women
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standing in deﬁance. Instead, the Nazis negotiated with the protesters and ﬁnally re-
leased the detainees.84 The fact that the imprisoned men were released indicates a small
social distance between some Germans and Jews. The Nazis were aware that the popu-
larity of the persecution of the Jews was limited and were anxious not to lose support
for their regime. In an effort to prevent social unrest, the regime ignored its ideological
principles and let the Jewish men go free.85
The ﬁnal conclusion to be drawn from this section on social distance is less
straightforward than the one drawn in the case of Rwanda. The years preceding the
1933 Nazi takeover consisted of peaceful relations and increasing integration.86 How-
ever, the ascension of the Nazi party to power brought with it a number of anti-Jewish
policies and laws.87 Through the administrative apparatus of Hitler’s machine, anti-
Jewish decrees sought to isolate the Jews and corrode German-Jewish interaction. How-
ever, in spite of such extensive legislation, there were several incidents which point to
the maintenance of small social distances. Consequently, although legislation made
strides toward widening the social distance between the two groups, interaction contin-
ued to occur. The bonds that connected the two were therefore still present, though
admittedly weakened.
Eastern Europe
Following the model of the previous sections, this paragraph addresses the degree of
social distance between the Polish and Baltic victim groups and the German perpetrator
group prior to the outbreak of the Jewish genocide in Eastern Europe (Poland and the
Baltic States). At this point, however, we depart from the previous composition. Speciﬁ-
cally, the perpetrator group in this case refers to the German army that invaded Poland
in 1939 and the Einsatzgruppen—small, mobile killing units of the Sicherheitspolizei
(Sipo) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD)—that invaded the USSR in 1941.88 The geographic
distance separating the victim and perpetrator groups limits the likelihood of social con-
tact, therefore rendering the social distance categories obsolete. Simple logistics imply
that intermarriage, social interaction, workforce integration, and community integra-
tion on anything other than a minimal level were absent. It can therefore be assumed
that the overall rate of victim and perpetrator group interaction prior to the outbreak of
genocide was so minimal that the social distance between them can be classiﬁed as
large.
Summing Up
The social distance in each pre-genocide context is summarized in Table 8.
Rwanda constituted the case with the smallest social distance. The Hutu perpetra-
tor group and the Tutsi victim group were not only characterized by high rates of inter-
marriage and social integration, but were also part of the same general workforce, social
circles, and neighborhoods. As a result, they had the greatest rate of interaction prior to
the outbreak of genocide in 1994. In the context of Eastern Europe, social distance
between the German perpetrator group and the Polish and Baltic victim groups was, for
all intents and purposes, nonexistent. Due to the geographic distance separating the
two, any meaningful interaction was unlikely. Ergo, it can be stated that the social dis-
tance between the perpetrator group and the victim group prior to the outbreak of the
Jewish genocide in Eastern Europe was large.
Comparatively speaking, the social distance prevalent in Western Europe (i.e., Ger-
many) falls somewhere between that of the other two genocides. This conclusion rests
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on the bisection of German-Jewish interactions before the outbreak of genocide. The
interaction between these two groups resembled two competing forces: high rates of
German-Jewish interaction before 1933 on the one hand, and institutionalized attempts
by the Nazi government to separate them on the other. Although not entirely successful,
the Nazis did manage to widen the social distance between these two groups. Conse-
quently, this case lies somewhere between Rwanda and Eastern Europe.
Dehumanization Measured
Table 9 below contains the 30 selected dehumanizing behaviors that the perpetrator
groups inﬂicted on victim groups. The table also illustrates which behavior belonged to
which genocide, as well as the method of categorization. It is important to keep in mind
that the table given to the participants only contained the behaviors. Following the pro-
cedure outlined under “Measuring Severity of Dehumanization,” these behaviors were
ranked based on their severity/cruelty.
The respondents’ answers enabled us to formulate several rankings of dehumaniz-
ing behaviors.89 They will be presented below.
Table 10 gives an overview of the different types of dehumanizing behavior per case
study and the average dehumanization score that our respondents attributed to them.
In terms of total severity of dehumanization, Rwanda received the highest total
average score of 19.6. Eastern Europe was placed second with a total score of 15.0, while
Western Europe received the lowest score at 11.9. When we look at the subtotals of the
dehumanizing behavior categories, Rwanda’s position as the genocide manifesting
the most severe behavior is further cemented. As Table 10 shows, Rwanda received the
highest score in three of the ﬁve categories. The Holocaust in Western Europe, on the
other hand, clearly exhibits the least severe dehumanizing behavior, despite having re-
ceived the highest score for psychological dehumanization (10.2). The Holocaust in
Eastern Europe is placed between Rwanda and Western Europe with several middle-
ranking scores.
Finally, we looked at the speciﬁc types of behavior with the ﬁve highest scores. The
ﬁgure below displays the results in the form of a column chart. The values represent the
data presented in Table 9.
Table 8 – Social Distance Prior to the Genocides in Rwanda, Western Europe and Eastern
Europe
Theatre Socio-Demographic Condition
Rate of
Inter-
marriage
Rate of
Social
Interaction
Rate of
Workforce
Integration
Rate of
Community
Integration
Total
Social
Distance
Rwanda High High High High Small
Germany
(Western
Europe)
Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Average
Poland and
Baltic States
(Eastern
Europe)
Low Low Low Low Large
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Table 9 – The Dehumanization Behavior List
Dehumanizing Behavior Genocide
Case
Category of Dehumanization
Behavior
1 Members of the victim group were
forced into slave labor for 12 hours a
day.
Western
Europe
Dehumanizing living conditions
2 Members of the victim group were
forced to march huge distances with
no food or rest.
Western
Europe
Dehumanizing living conditions
3 Members of the victim group were
forced to attend daily roll call.
Western
Europe
Psychological dehumanization
4 Skin of dead victims would be tanned
and stored for later use.
Western
Europe
Psychological dehumanization
5 Members of the victim group were
made to stand naked waiting to be
shot.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
6 Members of the victim group were
herded like sheep by members of the
perpetrator group.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
7 Men from the victim group were
kicked and dealt heavy blows.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
8 Members of the victim group were
forced to stand for a night outside in
the rain.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
9 The following medical experiments
were inﬂicted on members of the
victim group:
Hypothermia where victims were
placed in freezing water
Infectious diseases were injected
into victims
High altitude experiments using
low-pressure chambers
Pharmacological where victims
were subjected to poisons or gas to
test possible antidotes
Sterilization
Surgery such as bone-grafting
experiment
Traumatic Injuries to simulate battle
wounds
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
10 Members of the victim group
experienced beatings with riﬂe butts,
clubs, and whips.
Western
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
11 Up to 200 members of the victim
group were forced into closed cattle
wagons with no fresh air.
Eastern
Europe
Dehumanizing living conditions
(Table continued on next page)
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Table 9 – (continued)
Dehumanizing Behavior Genocide
Case
Category of Dehumanization
Behavior
12 Members of the victim group were
forced to live in fenced-off ghettos in
unsanitary conditions that resulted in
the repeated outbreak of epidemics
and high mortality rates.
Eastern
Europe
Dehumanizing living conditions
13 Members of the victim group were
assigned numbers to replace their
names.
Eastern
Europe
Psychological dehumanization
14 Laughing and jeering accompanied
beatings by the perpetrators.
Eastern
Europe
Psychological dehumanization
15 Members of the victim group were
made to march naked to pits and
forced to lie on top of corpses.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
16 Women from the victim group were
forced to throw their children into
graves alive where they would be shot
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
17 Members of the victim group were
forced to stand for hours in the
freezing cold, rain and snow and often
froze to death.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
18 Female members of the victim group
were raped.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
19 Members of the victim group were
beaten to death with clubs and iron
rods.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
20 Attack dogs would be set on members
of the victim group.
Eastern
Europe
Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
21 Members of the victim group were
deprived of methods to collect water,
which led to dehydration and death.
Rwanda Dehumanizing living conditions
22 Members of the victim group were
forced to live in mud and swamps in
the company of snakes, mosquitoes
and corpses.
Rwanda Dehumanizing living conditions
23 Members of the victim group were
called worms, cockroaches and
snakes.
Rwanda Psychological dehumanization
24 The killers would laugh, sing and
dance while they went about the task
of killing.
Rwanda Psychological dehumanization
25 Women from the victim group were
forced to march naked while being
forced to sing songs.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
(Table continued on next page)
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As one can see from this ﬁgure, four out of ﬁve of the highest-scoring behaviors
originated in Rwanda, thereby solidifying Rwanda’s position as the genocide with the
most severe dehumanization.
Severity of Dehumanization Scores and Social Distance Findings
Combining Results
When one combines the above ﬁndings for severity of dehumanization with those for
social distance, the relationship between the two variables becomes visible. While Rwanda
exhibited the least social distance but the greatest severity of dehumanization, Eastern
Europe, with its much greater social distance, displayed less severe dehumanization.
These ﬁndings imply that a high degree of social proximity dictates a high degree
of severity of dehumanization during the killing operations of genocide. Conversely, the
Table 9 – (continued)
Dehumanizing Behavior Genocide
Case
Category of Dehumanization
Behavior
26 Members of the victim group were
forced to kill their own children and
spouses were forced to kill their
partners.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization
without physical pain
27 Female members of the victim group
experienced systematic gang rape
from up to 15 perpetrators.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
28 Children from the victim group were
slammed against the walls until dead.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse without
instruments)
29 Members of the victim group would
have their body parts cut off and be
left to die slowly.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
30 Female members of the victim group
would have their vaginas punctured
with spears, arrows, or pointed sticks
and then have their genitals cut off
entirely.
Rwanda Physical dehumanization with
physical pain (abuse with
instruments)
Table 10 – Average Severity of dehumanization Score per Dehumanization Category (with
the scores for the categories: abuse with instruments and abuse without instruments)
Dehumanizing Behavior Category: Rwanda Eastern
Europe
Western
Europe
1 Dehumanizing Living Conditions 15.05 11.9 9.75
2 Psychological Dehumanization 9.3 6.65 10.2
3 Physical Dehumanization without Physical Pain 21.2 21.5 10.1
4 Physical Dehumanization with Physical Pain-
Abuse without Instruments
25.3 18.05 10.10
5 Physical Dehumanization with Physical Pain-
Abuse with Instruments
27.15 16.85 19.45
Total Average Score 19.6 15.0 11.9
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less social interaction there is prior to the outbreak of genocide, the less severe the dehu-
manization behaviors appear to be during the genocide.
These results corroborate our hypothesis, which had postulated that dehumaniza-
tion reduces the moral and cognitive obstacles that stand in the way of killing fellow
human beings. As explained by Bandura, empathetic emotions are elicited when one
perceives another as human.90 The elicitation of these feelings stems from perceived
similarity and identiﬁcation. Yet, if perceived similarity is replaced with perceived dif-
ference, the victim is removed from the moral, human realm and thus becomes destruc-
tible.91 In this way, dehumanization can break the bonds that tie human beings to one
another. Consequently, no matter the surrounding contexts, circumstances, cultures, or
environments, killing human beings is easier when those targeted are no longer bound
to the killers by their shared humanity. In support of this reasoning, one Nazi comman-
dant maintained that the degradation inﬂicted on concentration camp prisoners des-
tined to die was administered not with the aim of inﬂicting cruelty for cruelty’s sake,
but rather to severely diminish the humanity of the prisoner. In this way, those operat-
ing the gas chambers could carry out their duties with minimal distress.92 When ques-
tioned about a mass of bodies, another Nazi camp guard said, “It had nothing to do
with humanity, it couldn’t have; it was a mass—a mass of rotting ﬂesh.”93
In light of the results of this research, it can be stated that if dehumanization is nec-
essary in the mass murder of strangers (the Eastern Europe case), it appears absolutely
imperative in the mass murder of acquaintances (the Rwanda case). Breaking the ties
that bind human beings is difﬁcult in itself, so breaking ties that have been solidiﬁed by
social closeness is even harder and requires more effort. As noted by Albert Bandura,
“the joys and suffering of similar persons are more vicariously arousing than are those
of strangers”.94 Therefore, the termination of empathetic feelings and subsequent
Figure 1 Behaviors with the Five Highest Scores
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destruction of shared human bonds will require greater dehumanization if the targeted
individual is known to the perpetrator than if they were unknown. It is therefore unsur-
prising that out of all three cases the perpetrators in Rwanda infused their killing opera-
tions with the most severe dehumanization. As stated by Rwililiza, a survivor of that
genocide, “They cut and mutilated Tutsis to take from them all that was human and
thus kill them more easily.”95 The same survivor goes on to articulate, “Neighbors of
longstanding turned in a matter of hours into beasts.”96 Both statements imply a strong
relationship between severity of dehumanization on the one hand and the close social
proximity of the victim and perpetrator groups on the other.
In contrast to the Rwanda case, the genocide in Eastern Europe was deﬁned by a
vast social distance separating the German perpetrator group and the Eastern European
(Polish and Baltic) victim groups. They were not only physically separated but they
were also culturally and linguistically distinct. The victim group therefore represented
an entirely foreign body requiring a level of severity of dehumanization necessary only
to break the common bonds of general humanity, not those solidiﬁed by social close-
ness. With the paper’s theoretical framework constantly in mind, it can be concluded
that this entrenched social distance enabled the perpetrator group to approach their vic-
tims with a level of detachment not possible in Rwanda and as such, less severe dehu-
manization was administered. As stated by Felix Landau, an Einsatzgruppen member,
on recounting the experience of shooting Jews in the Eastern territories, “Strange, I am
completely unmoved. No pity, nothing. That’s the way it is and then it’s all over. My
heart beats just a little faster when involuntarily I recall the feelings and thoughts I had
when I was in a similar situation.”97
Importantly, brief attention should be given to the role played by local perpetrators
within the Baltic region and their dehumanization practices, as it strengthens our case
further. Recall, among the German forces that invaded the USSR were four units of the
Sicherheitspolizei and Sicherheitsdienst referred to as Einsatzgruppen. A main purpose
of these unites was to kill all Jewish inhabitants as they came into contact with them.98
The swiftness with which these units operated was reﬂected in the magnitude of the kill-
ings they carried out. For example, Einsatzgruppe A, which was sent to the major cities
of the Baltic States with their 250,000 Jewish inhabitants,99 reported the murders of
125,000 Jews by October 15 1941 – just four months after their initial invasion.100 In
fact, the overall proportion of Baltic Jewish deaths constitutes one of the largest in
Europe at 95%.101 The type of execution murder practice which predominated at the
hands of the Einsatzgruppen was mass outdoor shootings.102 As described by Kaufmann
“women and men embraced in farewell in the face of death. The luckless ones stood
there in their thousands and had to wait their turn, watching their brothers and sisters
being shot.”103 He goes on to describe, “it was the Germans who dragged Jews into the
prayer house, not to pray but to be burned alive. Thus the prayer house disappeared, as
did the old kworesman (gravedigger) R. Chaim.”104 The sheer number of these deaths
can be attributed to a straightforward approach backed by vast army assistance. How-
ever, one cannot overlook the role played by local collusion.105
The Einsatzgruppen in the former USSR territories were aided in their killing op-
erations by local auxiliary police units.106 In fact, vast numbers of Baltic Jews were mur-
dered by their fellow Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, and dehumanization was
particularly severe. As one Lithuanian survivor recalls, “the coarse Lithuanian mob [. . .]
acted with such beastly cruelty that by comparison, the Russian pogroms seemed like
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humanitarian deeds.”107 Another survivor recalls: “The Lithuanian murderers [. . .]
brought 550 men to the cemetery, forced them to dig a large pit and then ordered them
to kill each other with the shovels they were holding. A father was made to kill his son,
a brother his own brother.”108 The Lithuanians involved in the killings were often for-
mer customers, neighbors and classmates,109 which provides further corroboration for
our hypothesis. So while local Baltic perpetrators are not included in the German perpe-
trator group under examination and their genocidal behavior has no bearing on the re-
sults, the level of their dehumanization is interesting and worth mentioning given the
hypothesis posed.
Finally, the correlation between small social distance and severe dehumanization
ﬁnds additional support in previous studies, particularly the 1971 Stanford Prison
Experiment conducted by Phillip Zimbardo. To brieﬂy explain, a sample of 24 college
students from Stanford were selected to take part in a two-week experiment regarding
the psychology of prison life. These participants were randomly divided into two
groups – prisoners and guards – and were left to assume their respective roles. After
just six days, the experiment was terminated due to the extreme levels of dehumaniza-
tion and humiliation inﬂicted by the “guards” onto the “prisoners.”110 Although not a
genocidal incident, this experiment illustrates characteristics that are present in geno-
cide. Essentially, it pits two deﬁned groups against one another where one group holds
a dominant, more powerful position and the other is weaker and becomes victimized.
Furthermore, the groups in this example are separated by relatively small social dis-
tance. The volunteers were characterized by several common features, which in turn as-
sumes diminutive social distance. Speciﬁcally, they were all male college students of the
same age, from middle class backgrounds and lived in the same area.111 It can therefore
be assumed that the close social proximity deﬁning these two groups played a role in
the subsequent severity of dehumanization exhibited by those who played the part of
the guards. In keeping with the reasoning of this paper’s proposed hypothesis, severe
dehumanization was required in order to shatter the ties of humanity and social close-
ness thereby enabling the guards to perform their duties with greater ease.
The social distance-severity of dehumanization correlation intimated by Zimbar-
do’s study is strengthened further when compared to the BBC Prison Study. As with the
Stanford Prison Experiment, this 2002 study, broadcasted on BBC, pitted a prisoner
group against a guard group in a simulated prison scenario in order to study the psy-
chological and social ramiﬁcations. Unlike, Zimbardo’s study, however, the participants
were separated by a much larger social distance. The ﬁfteen participants were composed
of mentally stable men from all over Britain.112 Another distinction between the two
studies lies in the contrasting behavior of the guards. In the BBC experiment the guards
did not automatically adjust to their roles nor did they become accustomed to the
power that came with those roles. More importantly, they did not humiliate nor did
they dehumanize the prisoners under their charge.113 These particular developments
conﬁrm the proposed relationship between social proximity and severity of dehuman-
ization. It is likely that the social distance was much smaller between the participants in
the Stanford experiment, hence the severity of dehumanization. Conversely, the social
proximity between the BBC participants was much greater limiting the necessary sever-
ity of dehumanization. Thus, the Zimbardo experiment conducted in 1971 along with
the BBC Prison Study conducted in 2002 effectively corroborates our hypothesis.
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The Anomaly of Germany (Western Europe)
When applying the same comparative lens to the ﬁndings for Germany, the inverse
relationship between social distance and severity of dehumanization was not found.
Recall, the results for Germany revealed a social distance of a medium degree. Bisected
by two opposing forces, Germany was left with a social distance that was not as exten-
sive as desired by the Nazi regime, yet neither was it of the social proximity evident in
Rwanda. Moreover, the perpetrators within this context exhibited the least severe dehu-
manization behavior out of all three cases. If the ﬁndings were to support the reasoning
behind the hypothesis, this case would have exhibited greater severity of dehumaniza-
tion than Eastern European where the social distance was larger. The reasons behind
these particular results shall be tentatively explained below.
The relatively mild dehumanization evident in the case of Germany ﬁnds its roots
in the basic character of the Nazi regime and an underlying concern of Nazi bureaucrats
for the psychological and spiritual wellbeing of their killers. The Nazi perpetrators were
discouraged from excessive use of cruelty, torture and brutality, not just because such
savagery was considered counterproductive to the organized nature of the genocide
machine,114 but also because of their psychological wellbeing. The psyches of those em-
ployed to kill were considered to be of great importance to the functioning of the entire
operation.115 As a result, a number of steps were taken to restrict opportunities for sav-
age depravity and to lessen trauma and damage to the psyches of the perpetrators. It
was these steps that set the stage for more mild forms of dehumanization behavior.
First and foremost, the workings of the Holocaust were kept sharply in check by
the prohibition of unofﬁcial killings.116 In the clinical style so favoured by the Nazis,
killings fuelled by bloodlust or the emotional desires of the perpetrator were considered
beneath the superiority espoused by the Nazi regime. As a result, any action or killing
believed to be driven by cruel, sexual or egocentric intentions were punishable offences.
Killings that were conducted in line with Nazi legislation or under the umbrella of polit-
ical idealism went without penalty.117 Consequently, through these administrative and
legal restrictions, the perpetrators were limited in their opportunities to kill German
Jews brutally and were therefore restricted in their ability to dehumanize severely.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Nazi machine attempted to ease any
damage to the psyches and souls of the perpetrators by distancing them from their vic-
tims as much as possible.118 To clarify, despite the large social distance characterizing
the perpetrator and victim groups in Eastern Europe and the severe dehumanization in-
ﬂicted by the perpetrators, the mass shootings still proved traumatic for many perpetra-
tors. Not all the killers were able to approach the mass shootings with the degree of
detachment illustrated by Felix Landau above. In truth, these mass shootings involved
pervasive psychological distress that was illustrated by the widespread incidences of
alcoholism.119 Rudolph Höss, SS Kommandant in Auschwitz, illustrates the extent of
alcohol used by the ﬁring squad men: “Most of the members of the Special Action
Squads drank a great deal to help get through this horrible work. According to Captain
Rudolf Hofﬂe’s accounts, the men of Globocnik’s extermination section drank tremen-
dous quantities of alcohol.”120 Such extensive alcoholism was not limited to those per-
petrators stationed in the former USSR territories. As illustrated by Browning,
alcoholism was equally prevalent amongst the ﬁring squads of the Order Police sta-
tioned in Poland.121 Another reaction to the killings was the occurrence of suicide. As
recalled by Höss: “Another thing on my mind was the many suicides among the ranks
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of the SS Special Action Squads who could no longer mentally endure wading in the
blood bath. Some of them went mad.”122
In light of this, the Nazi administrators were impelled to ﬁnd a solution for the
more extreme “soul damage” and psychological distress that would certainly accompany
the killing of Western and speciﬁcally German Jews who were of a closer social proxim-
ity to the perpetrator group.123 The solution was the gas chamber. Höss explains the
reasoning behind it in the mass annihilation of Jews from Germany and other parts
of the West: “Only gas was suitable since killing by shooting the huge numbers ex-
pected [. . .] would also be a tremendous strain on the SS soldiers who would have to
carry out the order as far as the women and children were concerned.”124 Höss explains
further: “Now we had discovered the gas and the procedure [. . .] I had had enough
of hostage executions, and the mass killings by ﬁring squad ordered by Himmler and
Heydrich. Now I was at ease. We were all saved from these blood baths.”125
Consequently, an artiﬁcial distance was imposed between perpetrator and victim
that not only restricted the potential for greater psychological trauma, but also the
severity of dehumanization that would have occurred with the killing of socially closer
German and other Western European Jews. This artiﬁcial distance was increased fur-
ther by the employment of Jewish inmates both in the gassing process and also in the
subsequent clearing away of the dead bodies.126 The burial of the corpses as well as
their later incineration was also the responsibility of the Jews.127
The pervasive concern for the psychological wellbeing of the perpetrators allowed
the mass slaughter of the Jews from Germany, and by extension from Western Europe,
to ensue with milder dehumanization behavior. The synthetic distance imposed during
the killing operations of the German Jews therefore provides an explanation as to why
the German (Western Europe) case received the lowest score on the scale of severity of
dehumanization.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper developed the hypothesis that the smaller the social distance between the
perpetrator group and the victim group prior to genocide the more severe the dehu-
manization behaviors of the perpetrators during genocide. In order to illustrate this
hypothesis, the paper employed a literature-based analysis supplemented by a Vignette-
orientated severity scale in three genocide cases: Rwanda, the Holocaust as it occurred
in Western Europe and the Holocaust as it occurred in Eastern Europe.
The results show that Rwanda – the case with the smallest victim-perpetrator social
distance – displayed the most severe dehumanization behavior. Conversely, Eastern
Europe (Poland and the Baltic States) – the case with the greatest social distance
between the German perpetrator group and the Jewish Polish and Baltic victim group –
manifested less severe dehumanization behavior. From these two case ﬁndings, it ap-
pears as if the smaller the social distance preceding the outbreak of genocide the greater
the severity of dehumanization during the killing operations of genocide. The corrobo-
ration of this hypothesis is, however, encumbered by the Western Europe (Germany)
anomaly.
Despite greater intimacy between its victim and perpetrator groups, Western Europe
displayed less severe dehumanization than its Eastern Europe counterpart. However, the
distancing methods used by the Nazi administration to protect their perpetrators from
psychological trauma provide a tentative explanation as to why Western Europe received
a low severity of dehumanization score. Consequently, the demonstrated relationship
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between social proximity and severity of dehumanization still stands: the smaller the
social distance between the perpetrator and victim groups prior to the outbreak of geno-
cide, the more severe the dehumanization behaviors of the perpetrators during the killing
operations of the genocide.
It is acknowledged, that this research is limited in the extent to which it can draw
unequivocal conclusions. It is readily admitted that the literature-based nature of such
analysis contains restrictions in its ability to render unbiased objective information.
However, despite the limitations this type of research may have, it appears that the
hypothesis regarding the inverse correlation between social distance and severity of
dehumanization during genocide has found corroboration. With this in hand, one is
equipped with an adequate platform from which to launch further research and investi-
gation.
The Holocaust and later the Rwandan Genocide introduced the world to human-
ity’s ability to circumvent all moral, ethical and bureaucratic obstacles in a merciless
quest to exterminate fellow human beings. But more than this, the Holocaust and the
Rwandan Genocide introduced the world to the fundamental role dehumanization
plays in genocide and the ways in which its intensity varies and its trajectory is affected.
As long as humanity continues to commit genocide, dehumanization will continue
to chaperon it. Consequently, it is our duty as scholars and as members of the human
race to understand the dynamics of dehumanizing behavior during genocide, why it oc-
curs, why it varies and what can be done to combat it.
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